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1. An employer is not bound by the requirements of Title VII unless it employs fifteen or more
employees.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2005).
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Joe’s Widget Company, a sole proprietorship specializing in
manufacturing and selling widgets to businesses and consumers, operates in
a small community in the Midwest.  Joe started the company eighteen years
ago out of his own garage with a five thousand dollar loan from his father and
a single employee in his brother.  Within two decades, Joe’s had sales
exceeding four million dollars annually and sold its widgets to customers in
three different countries and twelve states.  With twenty-one employees, Joe’s
had become one of the community’s fifteen largest employers.1
However, the historical success of this small business is being threatened
by its present economic environment.  Over the last few years, competition in
the widget industry has become fierce.  Several foreign widget manufacturers
have used e-commerce to successfully penetrate the American widget market.
Due to significantly cheaper labor overseas, these foreign manufacturers have
a strong competitive advantage over domestic widget manufacturers.  In
response, many domestic manufacturers have moved their manufacturing
operations overseas to take advantage of the lower wage rates, a capability Joe
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(noting that “current employees would most often refer applicants like themselves”).
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39:31 (Westlaw); Louis A. Jacobs & Andrew J. Ruzicho, Communicating About Openings By Word-of-
Mouth, 1 EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES MANUAL § 4:1 (2006), available at 1 EMPPM 4:1 (Westlaw); STEVEN
KAHN & BARBARA BERISH BROWN, LEGAL GUIDE TO HUMAN RESOURCES § 2:17 (2006), available at
LGHR 2:17 (Westlaw).
feels he does not possess as a small manufacturer.  Furthermore, WidgMart,
a discount widget producer known internationally for “choking” its suppliers
for the lowest possible price in order to offer retail customers the absolute
lowest price, recently opened a store near Joe’s community.  By offering these
low prices, WidgMart is notorious for quickly putting small local competitors
out of business.  Moreover, due to skyrocketing healthcare costs, Joe is not
sure if he can continue to offer his employees health insurance while keeping
the company above water.  If he stops offering health insurance, Joe knows
that several of his most valuable and loyal employees will be forced to seek
employment elsewhere in order to insure themselves and their families.  Times
are very difficult for Joe’s Widget Company.
Despite these difficulties, due to a new production contract and a current
employee who wants to switch to part-time, Joe needs to hire another
employee.  Historically, Joe has actively encouraged and exclusively used a
word-of-mouth recruitment system in order to attract and hire new employees.
Joe’s only reasons for the policy are that it is a cost-free method of recruiting
employees and has previously resulted in a very efficient and reliable
workforce.  Joe has never considered racial animus a motivation for the
policy.  Because Joe’s current employees are all white, this system increases
the chances that prospective employees will likewise be white since
employees of a certain race are more likely to recommend friends and family
of the same race than persons of a different race.2  Joe’s local attorney has
cautioned him that continuing this recruitment policy could potentially result
in liability under Title VII through a disparate impact legal theory.3  Because
the company’s workforce is composed entirely of white workers and the
surrounding community has a twenty-percent minority population, Joe’s
attorney advised him that he potentially could be forced to adopt other
recruitment policies that require a greater investment of capital and time.
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4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2005).
5. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 417 (1975).
6. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-49 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540
U.S. 44 (2003).
7. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430-33.
8. See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (“If an employer can obtain
all the competent workers he wants, at wages no higher than the minimum that he expects to have to pay,
without beating the bushes for workers—without in fact spending a cent on recruitment—he can reduce
his costs of doing business by adopting [word-of-mouth recruitment].”); Kerri Koss Morehart, How to
Create an Employee Referral Program That Really Works, HRFOCUS, Jan. 2001, at 3 (stating that
employee referral programs lead to the lowest cost per hire of all recruitment methods).
9. See Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236; discussion infra Part III.
10. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236.
However, the extreme competition that Joe’s Widget Company currently
faces, Joe fears that a costly policy change could force the company into
bankruptcy.
An employer violates Title VII when he “fail[s] or refuse[s] to hire . . .
any individual . . . with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.”4  Congress’s primary goal in enacting Title VII was
to “achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees
over other employees.”5  Title VII causes of action arise under both “disparate
treatment” and “disparate impact” theories.  Disparate treatment theories
proscribe overt discrimination by requiring proof of employer intent or facts
from which the court can infer discriminatory intent.6  On the other hand,
disparate impact theories make it unlawful for employers to make use of
practices that are neutral on their face and in terms of intent, but that
discriminate in their operation.7
Generally, word-of-mouth recruitment is the cheapest form of employee
recruitment since it is essentially costless.8  Furthermore, under certain
circumstances, this form of recruitment may also be the most efficient and
effective practice for an employer.9  For instance, new employees procured
through existing employees’ referrals are generally more likely to have an
accurate picture of the current status of the business, its working conditions,
and the organization’s norms than employees acquired through methods
unconnected to the business, such as through employment agencies or
newspaper advertisements.10  Additionally, existing employees are unlikely to
refer persons who would not be a good fit within the organization because an
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11. Id.
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13. See, e.g., Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 926 (4th Cir. 1990) (instructing the
district court to award an injunction requiring the school board to publicly advertise vacancies); United
States v. Ga. Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 926 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that the employer’s word-of-mouth
recruiting practice must be supplemented or changed, and encouraging public advertising).
14. See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).
15. See, e.g., EEOC v. Andrew Corp., No. 81 C 4359, 1989 WL 134001, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12,
1989) (rejecting an employer’s argument that it should not be forced to adopt more costly recruiting
procedures since word-of-mouth recruitment attracted enough sufficiently qualified applicants).
16. See discussion infra Part IV.
17. 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993).
unworkable relationship between the employer and the referred employee only
reflects poorly upon the existing employee.11  Therefore, besides being much
cheaper than alternative recruitment methods, the result of word-of-mouth
recruitment may often be a better informed pool of new employees who are
more likely to be a good match within the organization.12  Yet a few circuit
courts of appeals have either fashioned or instructed district courts to fashion
remedies that require employers to pursue more expensive, and possibly less
efficient, recruitment methods.13
Efficiency has been accepted by at least one court as a sufficient
employer justification in rebutting a plaintiff’s prima facie case in the
disparate treatment context,14 but not yet in the disparate impact context.15
This article addresses why, under certain narrow circumstances,16 a small
business should be able to successfully rebut a plaintiff’s disparate impact
prima facie case based on efficiency and cost arguments, and thereby lawfully
maintain a word-of-mouth recruiting practice as its primary or exclusive
method of employee recruitment.
Part I of this Note examines the current status of the disparate impact
framework and the confusion surrounding an employer’s burden in
demonstrating business necessity under Title VII.  Part II scrutinizes the active
versus passive word-of-mouth practice distinction and describes the
circumstances under which employees have failed to successfully demonstrate
that word-of-mouth recruiting is a “particular employment practice.”  The
effect of the Seventh Circuit’s decision in EEOC v. Consolidated Service
Systems17 on how the efficiency of word-of-mouth practices plays a role in
Title VII analyses is the focus of Part III.  Lastly, this Note concludes that,
when a small business is under extreme competitive pressures and word-of-
mouth recruitment is the most efficient and effective method of recruitment,
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18. Coleman v. Sch. Bd. of Richland Parish, 418 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005).
19. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 645-49 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540
U.S. 44 (2003).
20. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 987 (1988) (plurality opinion).
21. See Cengr v. Fusibond Piping Sys., 135 F.3d 445, 451 (7th Cir. 1998) (observing the common
use of the burden-shifting approach for Title VII cases originally laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973)).
22. 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2005).  The three prongs can succinctly be labeled:  (1)
particular employment practice, (2) causation, and (3) disparate impact.
24. This causal relationship between the identified employment practice and the disparate impact
is usually proven through statistics.  However, the “statistical disparities must be sufficiently substantial
that they raise such an inference of causation.”  Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-95.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2005); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
the small business should not be vulnerable to employees’ disparate impact
claims under Title VII.
I.  DISPARATE IMPACT FRAMEWORK
Disparate impact claims do not require any evidence of an employer’s
discriminatory intent or motivation.18  Therefore, an employer’s facially
neutral employment practices that in operation have significant adverse
effects on protected groups may still violate Title VII.19  The motivation
behind the Supreme Court’s interpretation of disparate impact theories is that
certain employment practices that appear to lack deliberately discriminatory
motives “may in operation be functionally equivalent to intentional
discrimination.”20
The disparate impact framework entails a burden-shifting analysis that is
common in Title VII causes of action.21  The employee’s prima facie case
involves a three-prong analysis first formulated in part by the Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.22  In order to make out a prima facie case, the
employee must “demonstrate[] that a[n] [employer] uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”23  Therefore, the employee must identify
a specific employment practice and demonstrate that the identified practice
causes24 a disparate impact on a protected group.  The burden then shifts to the
employer to demonstrate “that the challenged practice is job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity.”25  If the employer
satisfies this burden, the employee may still prevail by demonstrating that an
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26. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977).
27. See Lanning v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 478, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1999).
28. 401 U.S. at 432.
29. 490 U.S. 642, 645-49 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003) (stating that “[a]
mere insubstantial justification . . . will not suffice . . . [but] there is no requirement that the challenged
practice be ‘essential’ or ‘indispensable’ to the employer’s business for it to pass muster . . . .”).
30. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
31. Lanning, 181 F.3d at 487.
32. See, e.g., Lanning, 181 F.3d at 488 (holding that “Congress intended to endorse the business
necessity standard enunciated in Griggs and not the Wards Cove interpretation of that standard”); Davey
v. Omaha, 107 F.3d 587, 591 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that “Congress intended to codify the standard
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. . . . .”).
33. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
34. 181 F.3d 478, 489 (3d Cir. 1999).
alternative employment practice has a lesser disparate impact and would also
serve the employer’s legitimate business interests.26
The interpretation of the business necessity defense, the second phase in
the disparate impact analysis, has often been a matter of debate.27  In a
landmark disparate impact case, the Supreme Court in Griggs interpreted the
business necessity prong as requiring the employer to show that the particular
employment practice has a “manifest relationship to the employment in
question.”28  Eighteen years later, the Court appeared to require a lesser
burden in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.29  This burden merely required
that the employer demonstrate that the business practice “serve[d], in a
significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer.”30  In
response, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991.31  While the Supreme
Court has not ruled on the business necessity doctrine since the Act was
passed, most courts have interpreted this legislation as codifying the Griggs
“business necessity” standard.32  Therefore, an employer must now go beyond
the Wards Cove interpretation by demonstrating that the employment practice
has a “manifest relationship to the employment in question.”33
Even though the Griggs standard appears to have prevailed after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, courts have since interpreted this standard in different
ways.  For instance, in Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation
Authority, the Third Circuit strictly interpreted the Griggs standard as
requiring an employer to demonstrate that the employment practice “measures
the minimum qualifications necessary for successful performance of the job
in question.”34  However, in Rosser v. Pipe Fitters Local 392, the Sixth Circuit
accepted the employer’s proffered business necessity justification for a name-
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35. No. 92-3016, 1993 WL 498220, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 3, 1993) (unpublished table decision).
36. Id. at *5 (citing Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1262 (6th Cir. 1981),
a pre-Wards Cove decision that interpreted the Griggs standard as requiring only that “the practice must
substantially promote the proficient operation of the business”).
37. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981).
38. See, e.g., Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509 (10th Cir. 1987) (quoting Williams
v. Colorado Springs, Colorado, School District No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the employment practice must go beyond being a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason and instead be
essential with a compelling purpose)); Lewis v. Bloomsburg Mills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 571-72 (4th Cir.
1985) (holding that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason burden is a “much less burdensome defensive
riposte”).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
40. 947 F.2d 292, 305 (7th Cir. 1991).  See also Jenson v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 824 F. Supp. 847,
867 n.46 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that, pursuant to EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, passive
reliance on word-of-mouth recruitment is not actionable under a disparate impact theory).
41. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d at 295.
request provision allowing contractors to request members of the union by
name.35  The court explicitly noted that “[e]fficiency may constitute a valid
business justification.”36  Therefore, while both courts cited Griggs as the
appropriate standard, Lanning appears to hold that the employment practice
must be absolutely necessary to the ongoing nature of the business, but Rosser
appears to apply a lesser burden based on the relative efficiency of the
employment practice and the importance of the employment practice to the
business.  Although the Griggs standard has been applied somewhat
differently by courts, it is settled law that the “business necessity” rebuttal to
the disparate impact prima facie case requires a greater showing than the
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason”37 rebuttal to the disparate treatment
prima facie case.38
II.  WORD-OF-MOUTH POLICIES AS PARTICULAR EMPLOYM ENT PRACTICES
Under the above framework, employees challenging an employer’s word-
of-mouth recruiting methods must first successfully argue that the method is
a “particular employment practice.”39  In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp
Works, the Seventh Circuit held that a word-of-mouth recruiting practice
undertaken solely by employees and only passively relied upon by the
employer is not a “particular employment practice” under a Title VII disparate
impact theory.40  The challenged employer relied almost exclusively on word-
of-mouth in order to fill positions within the organization, but never told or
encouraged existing employees to pursue this form of recruitment.41  At least
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42. Id. at 305.
43. Id.
44. Gaines v. Boston Herald, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 91, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1998).
45. EEOC v. Andrew Corp., No. 81 C 4359, 1989 WL 134001, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1989).  See
also Mont. Rail Link v. Byard, 860 P.2d 121, 134 (Mont. 1993) (holding that an employer’s word-of-mouth
policy that functioned to favor men satisfied the plaintiff’s initial burden).
46. If an employer makes use of other recruitment methods besides word-of-mouth practices, such
as advertisements or employee referral programs, the employer is far less likely to be susceptible to Title
VII liability.  Courts are more likely to be sympathetic to the employer’s cause, and the employer has a
better chance of having a workforce more representative of the population.  See Word-of-Mouth Recruiting,
supra note 3 (recommending that employers make use of walk-in applications, advertising, or state
employment agencies along with word-of-mouth recruiting); KAHN & BROWN, supra note 3 (“Where
employee referral is only one of many means of recruitment and not the principal source of applicants, there
is far less risk of perpetuating prior [discriminatory] patterns.”).
47. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
in the Seventh Circuit, “a more affirmative act by the employer must be shown
in order to establish causation.”42
However, where the employer actively encourages a word-of-mouth
recruiting practice or policy that is shown to cause a disparate impact on a
protected class, the plaintiff will likely establish his or her prima facie case.43
For instance, where an employer concedes that word-of-mouth communication
is vital to the company’s hiring outcomes and distributes different applications
based on whether or not the applicant was referred by existing employees, the
employer goes beyond being a passive participant in the practice and is
potentially subject to liability under a disparate impact theory.44  Likewise,
where an employer has a word-of-mouth policy, actively encourages its
primarily white workforce to announce vacancies, and only advertises in
newspapers aimed predominantly at white suburban markets, the employer is
an active participant in the practice.45
Therefore, assuming the employee can show through statistics that a
word-of-mouth practice causes a disparate impact on a protected class, an
employer that actively encourages its employees to refer their peers for job
vacancies or establishes a written policy mandating or encouraging such a
practice may be required to show a business necessity for the practice under
the burden-shifting disparate impact framework.46  If the employer is an active
participant in the practice, the plaintiff may successfully prove his or her
prima facie case.  Employers that actively and solely rely upon word-of-mouth
recruiting practices must be prepared to defend these employment practices
by demonstrating sufficient evidence that the practices “have a manifest
relationship to the employment in question”47 and therefore are required by
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48. See EEOC v. Andrew Corp., No. 81 C 4359, 1989 WL 134001, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1989)
(rejecting the defendant’s argument that business necessity required it to recruit through word-of-mouth
practices).  However, an employer has successfully rebutted a disparate treatment prima facie case based
on efficiency arguments.  See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1993); discussion infra
Part III.  See also Byard, 860 P.2d at 134 (accepting an employer’s proffered justification that the word-of-
mouth recruiting practice was necessary where the employer had to hire a large number of employees in a
relatively short period of time).
49. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
51. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
business necessity, an argument that no employer has yet successfully made
on disparate impact claims in federal court.48
While Joe’s Widget Company has not established a written word-of-
mouth recruitment policy, by merely encouraging its employees to refer
applicants for vacant positions, it would probably be forced to satisfy the
rigorous Griggs business necessity standard.  Joe’s admits to actively
encouraging its employees to undertake this form of recruitment.  This fact
alone goes well beyond the defendant’s actions in Chicago Miniature Lamp
Works.  Therefore, in this instance, a challenging plaintiff would likely satisfy
the “particular employment practice” component of the prima facie case,
thereby deeming Joe’s an active participant by encouraging the word-of-mouth
recruitment.  Furthermore, Joe’s solely relies upon word-of-mouth
recruitment.  Given the current racial composition of Joe’s workforce and the
surrounding community, a plaintiff challenging Joe’s recruitment practice
would probably establish causation and disparate impact, forcing Joe’s to
undertake the costly endeavor of defending its recruitment practice as
“consistent with business necessity.”49
III.  BUSINESS NECESSITY—EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT AFTER EEOC V.
CONSOLIDATED SERVICE SYSTEMS
If an employer is an active participant in the word-of-mouth practice, and,
as a result, the plaintiff is able to make a prima facie case of disparate impact,
the burden then shifts to the employer to prove that the practices are consistent
with business necessity.50  Therefore, an employer that encourages word-of-
mouth recruiting and is motivated solely by matters of cost savings and
efficiency must be capable of arguing that this practice bears “a manifest
relationship to the employment in question.”51
In EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems, an opinion authored by Judge
Richard Posner, the Seventh Circuit recognized and accepted an employer’s
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52. EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1993).  Prior to Consolidated, a line
of disparate treatment cases held that word-of-mouth recruiting practices provide evidence from which
courts can reasonably infer that an employer has intentionally discriminated against a protected class in
violation of Title VII.  See, e.g., Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421, 426 (8th Cir. 1970)
(holding that a word-of-mouth recruiting policy resulting in an “extraordinarily small number of black
employees” violated Title VII on disparate treatment grounds); Barnett v. W.T. Grant Co., 518 F.2d 543,
549 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Word-of-mouth hiring . . . is discriminatory because of its tendency to perpetuate the
all-white composition of a work force.”).
53. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 235.  However, the employer did buy newspaper advertisements on
three separate occasions.  Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 236.
56. Id.  The court noted that the employer went beyond defending the practice based on an efficiency
argument, but rather was motivated because the practice was the most efficient form of employee
recruitment.  Id.
57. Id.
assertion of the efficient results of its word-of-mouth recruiting practice in
rebuttal of a plaintiff’s prima facie showing in a disparate treatment case.52
In Consolidated, a small laundry business with annual sales of $400,000 and
owned by a Korean immigrant relied mainly on a word-of-mouth recruitment
practice to obtain new employees.53  The result of this practice was a 73%
Korean applicant pool and an 81% Korean workforce in the Chicago area.54
Despite this practice, the Seventh Circuit refused to infer that the employer
intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in order to be liable under a
disparate treatment theory.55  Because the employer showed that this form of
recruitment was the most efficient method of recruitment, the court accepted
this legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason as successfully rebutting the
plaintiff’s prima facie case.56  Regarding the efficiency of word-of-mouth
recruiting, Judge Posner remarked:
We said [word-of-mouth recruitment] is the cheapest method of recruitment.  It may also
be highly effective in producing a good work force.  There are two reasons.  The first is
that an applicant referred by an existing employee is likely to get a franker, more
accurate, more relevant picture of working conditions than if he learns about the job from
an employment agency, a newspaper ad, or a hiring supervisor.  The employee can give
him the real low-down about the job.  The result is a higher probability of a good match,
and a lower probability that the new hire will be disappointed or disgruntled, perform
badly, and quit.  Second, an employee who refers someone for employment may get in
trouble with his employer if the person he refers is a dud; so word of mouth recruitment
in effect enlists existing employees to help screen new applicants conscientiously.57
The court noted that in this exceptional circumstance, the employer, through
word-of-mouth hiring, was able to secure all of the competent employees it
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58. Id. at 235.
59. No circuit court outside the Seventh Circuit has yet cited Consolidated for this proposition.
60. The “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” burden is a lesser burden than the “business
necessity” burden in disparate impact cases.  See, e.g., Thomas v. Metroflight, Inc., 814 F.2d 1506, 1509
(10th Cir. 1987); Williams v. Colo. Springs, Colo., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) (stating that “in a
disparate impact case, unlike a disparate treatment case, a rational or legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
is insufficient.  The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling.”).
61. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236.
62. Id.  While merely speculation, the plaintiff may not have pursued the disparate impact claim due
to the great expense statistical analyses often entail in order to succeed on the merits.
63. Id.
64. See generally Elizabeth A. Madden, Comment, Minority-Owned Company’s Word-of-mouth
Recruiting not Disparate Treatment in Violation of Title VII:  EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems, 35
B.C. L. REV. 515, passim (1993) (discussing EEOC v. Consolidated Service Systems and the limitations
of the Seventh Circuit’s holding).
needed at a wage rate no higher than the minimum the employer expected.58
Therefore, where an employer can present evidence that efficiency was truly
its motivation in pursuing word-of-mouth recruiting, and the practice was
actually the most efficient form of employee recruitment, employers will
prevail in disparate treatment cases, at least in the Seventh Circuit, even if the
practice essentially bars certain protected classes from future employment
within the organization.59
Because the Consolidated analysis was based on a disparate treatment
theory, the conclusion on efficiency does not in itself extend to a disparate
impact theory wherein employers face heavier rebuttal burdens.60  However,
at the district court level, the plaintiff in Consolidated asserted both disparate
treatment and disparate impact claims.61  For undisclosed reasons, the plaintiff
abandoned its claim of disparate impact at the appellate level.62  However,
Judge Posner did comment, arguably in dicta, on what the appropriate analysis
would entail in a disparate impact context.  According to Posner, if the
circumstances were similar to the employer’s in Consolidated, “then the
advantages of word of mouth recruitment would have to be balanced against
its possibly discriminatory effect when the employer’s current work force is
already skewed along racial or other disfavored lines.”63  Therefore, the
benefits of cost savings, time savings, and a potentially more effective work
force would have to be weighed against the disparate impact the practice
causes.
Beyond the disparate impact and disparate treatment distinction, one must
be cautious of extending Consolidated’s holding on efficiency to future cases
for a few reasons.64  First, no court outside the Seventh Circuit has cited
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65. However, some employment handbooks and manuals have cited to Consolidated for this
proposition.  See, e.g., Ruzicho & Jacobs, supra note 3 (2005); Methods of Recruiting, 1 FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES § 4:26 (2005), available at 1 HRS-FEP 4:26.
66. Only seven word-of-mouth disparate impact cases have been published at the appellate level in
the last ten years.  See McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004); Settles v. Ill. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 42 F. App’x 872 (7th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th
Cir. 2000); Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 1999); Allison
v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998); Ballor v. Alcona County Rd. Comm’n, 145 F.3d
1329 (6th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); Balele v. Dep’t of Indus., Labor & Human Relations,
124 F.3d 203 (7th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
67. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 234.
68. Id. at 238.
69. Id.
70. See Madden, supra note 64, at 523-24.
71. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (holding that the objective of Title
VII “was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past
to favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees”).
72. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988) (plurality opinion).  While most
courts agree that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was at least partially motivated by the Wards Cove decision,
the current status of the “alternative employment practice” prong is also in question.  Title VII currently
provides that this prong “shall be in accordance with the law as it existed on June 4, 1989 . . . .”  42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2005).  Since the Watson plurality opinion was decided nearly one year before this
Consolidated for its statements on efficiency.65  This outcome is not
surprising, however, as both disparate impact cases and word-of-mouth cases
in particular are rare.66  Second, the Consolidated decision involved a
minority-owned business.67  The court explicitly noted the irony of using anti-
discrimination laws against the persons those laws were intended to protect.68
Forcing small minority-owned businesses, often “the first rung on the ladder
of American success,” to institute more costly hiring practices does not appear
to be in the spirit of Title VII intended by Congress.69  Therefore, while not
settled, Consolidated’s holding may only be relevant where the employer is
owned by a member of a minority class.70  Because the primary purpose
behind Title VII is the protection of minorities, a member of a majority group
is less likely to win the sympathy of a court of law when faced with
implementing more costly employment procedures.71  On the other hand,
arguments based on the efficiency and effectiveness of the practice hold true
regardless of the employer’s race or national origin.
Several other courts have made statements that leave open the possibility
of using cost and efficiency in Title VII analyses.  For instance, the Supreme
Court, in a plurality opinion, has stated that “the cost or other burdens of
proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether
they would be equally as effective as the challenged practice in serving the
employer’s legitimate business goals.”72  The Supreme Court addressed a
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date, its language at least arguably carries some persuasive weight.  Regardless, because the employer’s
business necessity burden precedes the employee’s requirement to demonstrate that alternative practices,
without similarly undesirable racial effects, would equally serve the employer’s interests, Watson’s holding
on cost considerations is not controlling in the instant case.  For more discussion of the effects of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 on Title VII, see the discussion supra Part I regarding the business necessity doctrine.
73. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 191 (1991).
74. Id. at 210-11 (The Court ultimately found in favor of the employee.).  See also id. at 217 (White,
J., concurring) (holding that “costs are relevant in determining whether a discriminatory policy is reasonably
necessary for the normal operation of a business”); id. at 224 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I think, for example,
that a shipping company may refuse to hire pregnant women as crew members on long voyages because
the on-board facilities for foreseeable emergencies, though quite feasible, would be inordinately
expensive”).  But cf. Hayes v. Shelby Mem’l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552 n.15 (11th Cir. 1984) (observing
that the potential for tort litigation is too contingent to amount to business necessity where, in today’s
litigious society, a hospital can purchase insurance to protect itself from potentially devastating litigation).
75. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986, 992 n.10 (5th Cir. 1982) (quoting Robinson v.
Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971)).
76. Rosser v. Pipe Fitters Local 392, 12 F.3d 214 (6th Cir. 1993) (unpublished table decision),
available at 1993 WL 498220, at **5 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 1993) (citing Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co.,
486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973)).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2005).  See Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704 (8th
Cir. 1988) (holding that the bona fide occupational qualification analysis in the ADEA context is similar
to the business necessity test and stating that the Eighth Circuit “has on different occasions applied the
same standard—‘manifest relationship’—to both”).
78. See, e.g., Orzel v. City of Wauwatosa Fire Dep’t, 697 F.2d 743, 755 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
that “economic factors cannot be the basis for a [bona fide occupational qualification], since precisely those
considerations were among the targets of the ADEA”); Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686,
691 (8th Cir. 1983) (“If the existence of . . . higher salaries can be used to justify discharging older
employees, then the purpose of the ADEA will be defeated.”).
subsequent Title VII case where the employer had a policy of excluding
women from battery manufacturing positions in which the health of fetuses
would potentially be at risk due to lead exposure.73  The Court stated that it
was not deciding “a case in which [tort liability] costs would be so prohibitive
as to threaten the survival of the employer’s business.”74  The economic
consequences of a malformed child due to working conditions “could be
financially devastating, seriously disrupting the ‘safe and efficient operation
of the business.’”75  The Sixth Circuit, in holding that a union’s name-request
provision was a legitimate business justification, stated that “[e]fficiency may
constitute a valid business necessity.”76
Other courts have been more skeptical.  For instance, in the arguably
analogous Age Discrimination in Employment Act context,77 several courts
have held that economic factors cannot form the basis of a “bona fide
occupational qualification” since economic factors were fully considered
when drafting the ADEA.78  However, unlike the ADEA, where Congress’s
purpose was to curb the mistreatment of older employees when their
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79. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
80. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir. 1971).
81. See infra Part IV for an in-depth discussion of the numerous benefits of word-of-mouth
recruiting other than the cost-free nature of the practice.
82. Some of these circumstances may be similar to the circumstances of the employer in EEOC v.
Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, passim (7th Cir. 1993).  See infra Part III.
employment may become more costly to organizations, the primary objective
of Title VII “was to achieve equality of employment opportunities . . . .”79
Therefore, these ADEA cases are not very persuasive in the Title VII context,
where equal treatment and opportunities, rather than purely economic factors,
are the primary targets of the law.  In considering the Griggs standard, one
court observed, “[w]hile considerations of economy and efficiency will often
be relevant to determining the existence of business necessity, dollar cost
alone is not determinative.”80  However, given the effectiveness of the
recruitment practice and the significant competitive pressures currently facing
Joe’s Widget Company, the circumstances arguably go well beyond imposing
merely additional raw dollar costs to the company.81
IV.  SMALL BUSINESSES AND WORD-OF-MOUTH PRACTICES
This Note proposes that, under certain specific circumstances,82 small
businesses should be able to actively encourage and solely rely upon word-of-
mouth recruitment practices without being vulnerable to disparate impact
liability.  Revisit once again the hypothetical plight of Joe’s Widget Company.
Joe’s is experiencing intense competition from foreign widget manufacturers,
domestic widget companies that outsource manufacturing processes overseas
to take advantage of cheap labor, and huge widget conglomerates like
WidgMart.  At the same time, the company is encountering rapidly increasing
energy, labor, and healthcare costs, all of which threaten the company’s
survival.  Joe’s policy of only recruiting employees through referrals from
existing employees is one area in which the company can successfully control
costs.  Not only is word-of-mouth recruiting virtually cost-free, but Joe’s has
also been highly successful throughout the eighteen-year history of the
company in attracting and retaining strong, competent, and highly motivated
employees through this practice.  Joe’s employee turnover rate is very low, but
is threatened by the reality that Joe may be forced to cut or even eliminate
employee healthcare benefits altogether if costs continue to rise as forecasted.
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83. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 837 F.2d 1127, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(dissenting opinion) (observing that Congress was convinced that protection of small business equated to
protection of a competitive economy); Stomp, Inc. v. Neato, LLC, 61 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1080 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (stating that “small businesses make up the backbone of the American economy . . .”); Minn. Energy
& Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Printy, 351 N.W.2d 319, 340 (Minn. 1984) (commenting on economic studies that
“demonstrate[] the important role of small businesses in creating jobs and stimulating economic growth”);
State v. Ludlow Supermarkets, Inc., 448 A.2d 791, 795 (Vt. 1982) (observing the state legislature’s view
that “small business enterprises are essential and fundamental to the economy of the state”).
84. See Small Business Administration, Frequently Asked Questions, http://sba.gov/advo/stats/
sbfaq.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2007).
85. See Geoffrey Colvin, America Isn’t Ready [Here’s What to Do About It], FORTUNE, July 25,
2005, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2005/07/25/8266603/
index.htm.
86. See Michael Kinsman, Access to Benefits at Small Businesses May Be Declining, UNION
TRIBUNE, Aug. 21, 2005, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050821/news_
1b21kinsman.html; Anthony Mason, The Issues:  Small Businesses, CBS NEWS (CBS television broadcast
July 7, 2004), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/07/07/eveningnews/main627978.shtml.
87. See Mason, supra note 86 (stating that “nearly six million small business owners now rank rising
health care costs as their number one concern”).
88. See New Bankruptcy Legislation Undercuts Important Safety Net for Entrepreneurs, Ewing
Marion Kauffman Foundation, http://www.kauffman.org/entrepreneurship.cfm?topic=capital_
markets&itemID=623 (discussing the inaccuracy of recent government bankruptcy statistics and how the
Under these circumstances, every opportunity to cut costs or increase revenues
is critical to the future success and stability of Joe’s Widget Company.
Small businesses have historically been the driving force behind the
American economy.83  Small businesses represent 99.7% of all employer firms
and annually provide for between 60% and 80% of new job growth within the
economy.84  Our country would not be where it is today without the
entrepreneurship and innovation of our domestic small businesses.  However,
American small businesses today are experiencing more competitive pressure
than ever before.  First, due to lower labor costs, more mobile organizations,
globalization trends, and virtually cost-free communication across borders,
many American businesses, especially manufacturers, are struggling to
compete with foreign businesses and domestic businesses with foreign
operations.85  Many small businesses are struggling to find the resources and
capabilities to compete in this environment.  Furthermore, the costs of
maintaining healthcare and retirement benefits for employees are currently
skyrocketing.86  Small businesses that are no longer able to offer these benefits
will be at a distinct competitive disadvantage in the economy.87  Without
offering these benefits, small businesses may no longer be able to retain
valuable employees.  Additionally, the recently enacted Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 has potentially devastating
repercussions for small businesses.88  Because entrepreneurs, independent
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new changes to the Bankruptcy Code will likely negatively affect entrepreneurs and small businesses).
89. Mason, supra note 86.
90. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(c) (2005).  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
was passed largely in response to numerous instances of corporate and accounting fraud and regulates
corporate governance, financial disclosure, and the practice of public accounting.  Publicly-traded
companies were the only companies intended to be impacted by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
91. See MARC MORGENSTERN & PETER NEALIS, THE IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ON MID-CAP
ISSUERS, at 16-17 (2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/mmorgensternmidcap.pdf (noting
that, due to Sarbanes-Oxley, some lenders and insurers are requiring non-publicly traded companies to
comply with the legislation, and some states are in the process of developing similar state legislation
applicable to private institutions).
92. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074, as recognized in Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 398 (6th Cir. 2005).
See discussion supra note 72 regarding Watson and the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
93. Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
94. See EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing how word-of-
mouth recruiting is virtually costless).
95. See id. at 236.
96. Gerald L. White, Employee Turnover:  The Hidden Drain on Profits, HRFOCUS, Jan. 1995, at
contractors, and self-employed individuals have historically used the
bankruptcy laws as a safety net in the event of dismal economic
circumstances, the harsher new consumer bankruptcy standards, which apply
to many small businesses, could affect the survival of many small
businesses.89  Furthermore, some experts expect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act90 to
have unintended negative effects on small businesses.91  Therefore, it is clear
that small businesses today are competing in an environment very different
from the competitive environment of even a decade ago.
In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,92 the Supreme Court stated that
“disparate impact theory need [not] have any chilling effect on legitimate
business practices.”93  If a court were to force a small business like Joe’s
Widget Company to adopt more costly recruiting or hiring practices, a chilling
effect could easily be realized.  Although the virtually cost-free nature of
word-of-mouth recruiting is a significant cost savings for an organization, the
more vital economic benefits of such a policy are of a more indirect nature.94
While some opponents may argue that the extra couple hundred dollars to
advertise job vacancies in a local newspaper is not a prohibitive cost for a
company, few persons would dispute the great importance and economic
relevance of having a well-informed and hard working group of loyal
employees who work well together and are more likely to stay with the
company for a prolonged period of time.95  For instance, one source estimates
that it costs an employer one-third of a new hire’s annual salary to replace that
employee.96  Furthermore, multiple researchers have noted the difficulty
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15 (citing U.S. Department of Labor statistics).
97. Marilyn Carroll et al., Recruitment in Small Firms:  Processes, Methods and Problems, 21 EMP.
REL. 236, 238 (1999); Mike Thatcher, The Big Challenge Facing Small Firms, PEOPLE MGMT. 20, passim
(1996).
98. See Roger Herman, Reducing Costly Employee Turnover, HRFOCUS, June 1997 1, 2-3 (listing
the direct and indirect costs related to employee turnover for an organization).
99. See, e.g., James A. Breaugh & Mary Starke, Research on Employee Recruitment:  So Many
Studies, So Many Remaining Questions, 26 J. OF MGMT. 405, 412 (2000); Kirnan et al., supra note 2, at
295; Steven L. Premack & John P. Wanous, A Meta-Analysis of Realistic Job Preview Experiments, 70 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 706, 712 (1985); Philip L. Quaglieri, A Note on Variations in Recruiting Information
Obtained Through Different Sources, 55 J. OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 53, 55 (1982).
100. See Breaugh & Starke, supra note 99, at 419 (discussing lower turnover and higher levels of
employee satisfaction); Kirnan et al., supra note 2, at 304-06 (finding higher quality applicant pools,
applicant self-screening, and lower employee turnover); Premack & Wanous, supra note 99, at 712
(discussing applicant self-screening, better employee performance, and higher organizational commitment
and job satisfaction).  See also Morehart, supra note 8, at 3 (outlining all of the organizational benefits of
a well-designed employee referral program, including the above and lower overall costs per hire, better
cultural fits, and stronger employee networks).
101. Breaugh & Starke, supra note 99, at 412; M. Susan Taylor & Donald W. Schmidt, A Process-
Oriented Investigation of Recruitment Source Effectiveness, 36 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 343, 344 (1983).
confronting many small businesses in attracting and retaining high caliber
employees in today’s economy.97  The direct and indirect costs, often in the
form of lost efficiency, a disheartened or unmotivated workforce, employee
turnover, and personal conflict within an organization can be enormous and
much more damaging than advertising costs alone.98
Numerous empirical and theoretical studies and papers in the social
sciences arena have addressed the positive outcomes related to recruitment by
employee referral, a form of word-of-mouth recruitment.  For instance, under
what researchers in the area coined the “realistic information hypothesis,”
employees recruited through informal recruitment sources, such as through
employee referrals, consistently received more accurate and candid job
descriptions than employees recruited through more formal sources.99  Armed
with the more realistic information regarding the position, several studies
found positive outcomes for organizations, including lower turnover, better
employee performance, a more qualified applicant pool, and higher levels of
job satisfaction and organizational commitment.100  Theorists explain these
outcomes as resulting from a number of factors.  For example, with a more
accurate description of the position and its demands on the prospective
employee, an applicant can easily “self-select” herself out of consideration if
she feels the position will not satisfy her needs.101  With this more accurate
knowledge, new employees may also be more capable of coping with job
demands and more satisfied with the job due to potentially lowered
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102. Kirnan et al., supra note 2, at 295; Taylor & Schmidt, supra note 101, at 344.
103. Kirnan et al., supra note 2, at 294.  See also EEOC v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th
Cir. 1993).  Current employees may be motivated to refer only quality applicants for fear of damaging their
relationships with the employer.
104. Rachel S. Shinnar et al., The Motivations for and Outcomes of Employee Referrals, 19 J. BUS
& PSYCHOL. 271, 273 (2004).
105. Don Gudmundson & Linda S. Hartenian, Workforce Diversity in Small Business:  An Empirical
Investigation, J. SMALL BUS. 27, 29 (July 2000) (discussing the negative image sometimes accompanying
a homogeneous workforce); Carroll et al., supra note 97, at 237; Kirnan et al., supra note 2, at 293.
106. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236.  See supra Part III.
107. An organization employing this recruitment method will save resources both in advertising
savings and time savings due to a smaller but arguably more qualified applicant pool.
expectations surrounding the position.102  Furthermore, under the “pre-
screening hypothesis”:
The assumption is that applicants referred by current employees . . . are prescreened by
these employees.  As “screeners,” current employees have the benefit of knowing both
the job and the individual.  Armed with this information, they are able to refer those
applicants who are well qualified for the job.  Additionally, current employees often feel
that their reputation is at stake with a referral.  This threat encourages them to refer only
the highest quality applicants.103
One recent study even focused on the positive effects and outcomes the
employee referral process generally has on the employee making the
recommendation.  The study theorized that, when referring prospective
employees, employee recommenders generally experience higher levels of job
satisfaction and organizational commitment because:  (1) they relive their
satisfaction in joining or confirm their happiness in being part of the
organization (self-involvement); (2) they “reinforce their conviction that they
made the right choice in working for the employer” (self-confirmation); or (3)
they fulfill their desire to share the benefits of joining the organization with
prospective employees.104  However, some of these same studies warn of some
of the adverse effects that the practices can have on protected groups and on
the reputation of the organization as a whole.105
Therefore, there is empirical and theoretical support for Judge Posner’s
statements in Consolidated that word-of-mouth recruitment results in (1) a
higher probability of a good match due to a better informed applicant under
the “realistic information hypothesis,” and (2) a higher quality applicant pool
under the “pre-screening hypothesis” whereby employees will likely only refer
potential applicants that would fit with the organizational culture.106  Coupled
with the clear economic savings107 of the effectively costless recruitment
approach and the hypothesis that the employees making the referrals also
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108. However, due to the increasing number of struggling small businesses and the changing
economic environment, the trend in our American economy is expanding this narrow circumstance.
109. Consolidated, 989 F.2d at 236 (7th Cir. 1993).
110. Under Posner’s balancing test, larger businesses would likely have a difficult argument when
trying to persuade a court that the balance favors the word-of-mouth practice over any potential
discriminatory effects.  Because large businesses normally have a greater ability to absorb higher
recruitment costs, the purposes of Title VII would likely prevail.
111. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971)).
benefit from the practice, there is substantial legal, empirical, and theoretical
support for the proposition that word-of-mouth recruitment can be a very
efficient and effective recruitment practice for small businesses.  For all of the
foregoing reasons, there is a strong argument that, under appropriate
circumstances, word-of-mouth recruiting is not only very cost-efficient, but
also very effective in producing the optimal workforce within an organization.
To force a small business to pursue a less than optimal procedure in recruiting
employees could be devastating to the future of the business.
This article does not propose an exclusive pass for every small business
to use word-of-mouth recruiting exclusively.  Rather, only in the narrow
circumstances108 where the small business is in a highly competitive
environment and the ongoing nature of the business is at serious risk, such as
the circumstances of Joe’s Widget Company, should the small business be
able to exclusively rely upon word-of-mouth recruiting practices.  As Judge
Posner stated, “the advantages of word of mouth recruitment . . . have to be
balanced against its possibly discriminatory effect when the employer’s
current work force is already skewed along racial or other disfavored lines.”109
Therefore, under Judge Posner’s balancing test, a small business in similar
circumstances as Joe’s would likely prevail over a disparate impact claim if
courts considered as factors demonstrating the advantages of word-of-mouth
recruitment the business’s highly competitive environment, rising costs across
the board, and most importantly, the often high efficiency and effectiveness
of word-of-mouth recruiting itself.110  A court’s role would be, after
considering the racial effects, the small business’s current circumstances, and
the employer’s proof of the efficiency and effectiveness of the employment
practice, to make a reasoned judgment on whether the balance weighs in favor
of the small business keeping its recruiting practices intact.
This proposed outcome does not necessarily conflict with the purposes
of Title VII.  To require a company under Joe’s circumstances to implement
such costly changes would not be in line with the asserted purpose of Title
VII, that being “to achieve equality of employment opportunities.”111  While
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112. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 993 (1988) (plurality opinion).
one cannot dispute the racial inequalities still present in the American
economy, a blanket limitation on word-of-mouth recruiting would not benefit
any party involved.  The employer would be rendered competitively crippled,
the company’s future would be in jeopardy, and the jobs currently provided
by the small business employer would be at risk.  Remember that the Supreme
Court stated that “disparate impact theory need [not] have any chilling effect
on legitimate business practices.”112  Because no party benefits from the
alternative, there should be no more legitimate a business practice than the
survival of a small business in these circumstances.
V.  CONCLUSION
Today, Joe is reluctantly contemplating following his attorney’s advice
and invoking more costly recruiting procedures to fill the company’s vacancy.
However, he truly fears that the additional costs associated with both
implementing new procedures and a potentially more ineffective workforce
could put Joe’s Widget Company out of business.  Under the current business
necessity precedent first set forth in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and recently
interpreted by the Third Circuit in Lanning v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority, the maintenance of Joe’s current recruiting policy
could easily put the future of the Company at risk.  Such an outcome in which
no affected party would benefit cannot be what Congress intended when
enacting Title VII, nor what the Supreme Court intended when interpreting its
standards.  If courts hearing such disparate impact cases would simply
consider the demonstrated efficiency and effectiveness of word-of-mouth
recruitment and the economic circumstances of the small employers when
embarking upon Judge Posner’s balancing test, small businesses in Joe’s
circumstances would not suffer this extreme outcome.  As Joe debates what
to do from here, he can only ponder the future of the company he built and
whether his desperate circumstances would be considered by a court.
